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Business Records and the Fifth Amendment Right
Against Self-Incrimination
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution declares:
"No person . .. shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a wit-
ness against himself. . . ." This constitutional right' against self-
incrimination has suffered from an uncertainty of interpretation. One
commentator has observed: "The [Supreme] Court has construed the
clause as if its framers neither meant what they said nor said what they
meant."
2
This Note will examine the clause as it has been applied to busi-
ness records. The scope of fifth amendment protection afforded busi-
ness records is significant because of the importance of records to vir-
tually any business, and because of the long-term trends of diminished
protection for records, even while other aspects of the fifth amend-
ment right have been expanded. The early history of the common law
and constitutional protections for oral testimony and writings, as well
as established exceptions to the amendment's coverage for documents,
will be surveyed first. Then two recent Supreme Court cases, Fisher
v. United States4 and Andresen v. Maryland,5 each of which further
significantly limits the fifth amendment protection of business records,
will be discussed. Finally, various views of the fifth amendment and
the current status of the law will be analyzed.
It is the thesis of this Note that the Supreme Court has ignored
many important policy considerations, the words of the Constitution,
and preconstitutional history in limiting the scope of the fifth amend-
ment to only (1) compelled (2) testimonial communication that (3) in-
criminates, with each of these terms being narrowly defined. Be-
cause of the Court's restrictive interpretation, only minimal fifth
amendment protection for business records remains.
1.
Jurists and legal commentators invariably speak of the "privilege" against self-
incrimination. I refer to it as a "right" because it is one, having the same status,
constitutionally, as free speech, trial by jury, benefit of counsel, and other guarantees
of the Bill of Rights. A privilege is a revocable concession granted by the government
to its subjects. . . To speak of the "privilege" against self-incrimination, degrades it,
inadvertently or otherwise, in comparison to other constitutional rights.
L. LEvy, The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History and Judicial History, in JunDmr"rs 265,
279 n.9 (1972).
2. Id. at 274. For instance, the right protects a person when his answers might have crim-
inal consequences, whether or not in a criminal case. See, e.g., Counselmn v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 652 (1892) (right held applicable to grand jury investigation).
3. Eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). For a discussion of Fisher v. United States, see section UI.A. infra.
5. 427 U.S. 463 (1976). For a discussion of Andresen v. Maryland, see section III.B. infra.
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I. EARLY HISTORY OF THE RIGHT6 FOR BUSINESS RECORDS
A. English Common Law
The common law right against self-incrimination was established
in England around 1650. 7 Although the right originally protected just
against the compulsion of oral testimony, it was expanded during the
early eighteenth century to also protect against the forced production
of books, papers, and documents that might tend to be self-incrimina-
ting.8 The right applied to "private" writings, but the English common
law did not recognize a dichotomy between personal and business doc-
uments in defining "private." 9 A corporation's records were granted
the same protection as an individual's personal records when they
would tend to incriminate a defendant. Furthermore, the capacity of
the person who was compelled to produce documents did not affect the
protection afforded the documents. In Rex v. Purnell,' involving rec-
ords of a university, the court rejected arguments advanced by the
prosecution that the motion to produce the records "does not respect
[Purnell] as defendant but as public officer"" and that "[t]he universit,
is not accused; the university may therefore very safely produce their
books."
12
Thus, the English common law right against self-incrimination pro-
tected any arguably private documents. No prerequisites such as own-
ership, exclusive access and knowledge of the contents, or possession in
a personal capacity were required in order to claim the right. Business
records of an individual or an entity were immune from any compul-
sory production that might incriminate the possessor.
B. Constitutional Protection for Documents
The right against self-incrimination was part of the common law
inheritance of the American colonies." When the colonies broke from
England, several states transformed the common law right into a con-
stitutional right, 14 and this development continued on the national level
with the adoption of the fifth amendment. The first Supreme Court
case dealing with business records and the fifth amendment was the
6. For an exhaustive history, see L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF TilE F)i-ir AMENDMENT (1968). For
a concise summary, see L. LEVY, The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History and Judicial
History, in JUDGMENTS 265 (1972).
7. Eg., Trial of Lilburne, State Trials, IV (1649); see L. LEvy, ORIGINS OF Tilt Firrm
AMENDMENT 312-13 (1968).
8. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 320, 390 (19(,8),
9. See, e.g., Rex v. Worsenham, 91 Eng. Rep. 1370 (K.B. 1701).
10. 96 Eng. Rep. 20 (K.B. 1749), same case differently reported 95 Eng. Rep. 595.
11. 96 Eng. Rep. at 22.
12. Id. at 23 (emphasis in original).
13. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 333 (1968).
14. Id. at 405.
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landmark case of Boyd v. United States," decided in 1886. Boyd held
that the federal right against self-incrimination protected business rec-
ords. The case involved a civil forfeiture proceeding against two mem-
bers of a family partnership for attempting to import glass without pay-
ing the duty. The government demanded that the partners produce a
certain invoice from a previous importation. A statute provided that if
a person did not produce an invoice, the government's allegations
relating to the invoice would be taken as confessed. The partners pro-
duced the invoice, but protested that the statute was unconstitutional
for compelling them to provide evidence to be used against them.1
6
The trial court admitted the evidence, and the jury found for the
government. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the statute uncon-
stitutional on fifth and fourth amendment grounds.17  The Court con-
sidered the invoice to be within the category of "private, books and
papers"18 protected by the fifth amendment notwithstanding its busi-
ness nature and its connection with a partnership. t9 Throughout its
opinion, the Court referred to the unconstitutionality of invading ones
"indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property,"20 and to how compelled production was an incident of des-
potic power unsuited to the legal traditions of both England and Amer-
ica.21 In order to avoid the erosion of constitutional rights, provisions
for protecting the security of people and property were held to require a
liberal construction. 22 Boyd's broad protection for business records,
however, did not endure. Since Boyd, the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination as it pertains to business records has been
slowly but consistently eroded by a series of exceptions.
II. ESTABLISHED EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT
A. Corporations
The Supreme Court's 1906 decision in Hale v. Henke123 marked the
start of a trend severely limiting fifth amendment protection for busi-
ness records by denying the right against self incrimination to corpora-
tions. Hale, secretary and treasurer of a corporation, had received a
subpoena duces tecum commanding him to produce certain agree-
15. 1i6 U.S. 616 (1886).
16. Id. at 617-18.
17. Id. at 633-35, 638.
18. Id. at 634.
19. In addition, the Court held that the results of the forfeiture proceedings were basically
criminal so the amendments protection applied. Id. The Court also held that the claimant could
rely on the amendment even though it was technically a proceeding in rem. Id. at 638.
20. Id. at 630.
21. Id. at 631-32.
22. Id. at 635.
23. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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ments, correspondence, and reports of the corporation for a grand jury
investigating violations of the Sherman Act. He declined to do so and
was found in contempt of court. On direct appeal the Supreme Court
affirmed a denial of habeas corpus.
Under the circumstances, Hale lacked a personal right against self-
incrimination because of an immunity statute.24 The Court held the
fifth amendment right to be purely personal and thus unavailable to an
agent when the principal, whether an individual or a corporation, might
be Incriminated. 25  The Court felt that otherwise many valid cases
would fail because they could be proved only from the corporate pa-
pers. Although a corporation is "an association of individuals," and
"[i]n organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional
immunities appropriate to such body," 26 its rights were held not to in-
clude the right against self-incrimination.
In Hale, the Court offered little guidance as to what it considered
"appropriate" constitutional rights for corporations. Apparently the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination was inappropriate be-
cause it is a personal right, and a corporation must act through its
agents rather than personally. Although one might reasonably argue
that the records of a large corporation are not "private books and pa-
pers" such as those protected in Boyd, this case foreshadowed the
weakening of constitutional protections for more private documents,
as well.
The issue not resolved in Hale-whether, absent an immunity stat-
ute, a corporate officer could refuse to produce corporate documents on
the ground that the officer might be personally incriminated-was an-
swered in the negative in Wilson v. United States.27 A grand jury had
issued a subpoena duces tecum to a corporation to produce copies of
letters and telegrams signed by its president. The subpoena was served
on Wilson as president when he was already under indictment for
fraudulent use of the mails and conspiracy. Wilson refused to produce
the copies because he believed they would tend to incriminate him, and
the trial court found him in contempt. The Supreme Court rejected
Wilson's fifth amendment argument and affirmed the contempt convic-
tion. It contrasted the private books and papers of the partnership pro-
tected in Boyd with the corporate books involved in Wilson. Neither
authorship nor possession affected the result because the documents
involved were not private papers. By assuming custody of them, an
officer was deemed to accept the obligation to permit inspection. The
24. Immunity statutes require one to testify in exchange for a certain degree of immunity
from prosecution for crimes relating to the testimony. Because the statutes render the testimony
non-incriminating, they have been upheld against fifth amendment attacks, See Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
25. 201 U.S. at 69-70.
26. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
27. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
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principle applied both to public documents in public offices and to
records required by law to be kept. Although the Court acknowl-
edged that early English cases were to the contrary, it declined to fol-
low them, noting that they could not be deemed controlling. Associa-
ting with a corporation thus included, in certain circumstances, the
price of relinquishing one's right not to incriminate oneself. Later,
other activities would similarly lead to a lessening of the fifth amend-
ment's protection.28
Two years after Wilson the Court extended that case's impact in
Grant v. United States.29 While Wilson had involved a large corpora-
tion, the corporation in Grant had only one stockholder. The Court
summarily discounted this distinction and held the right automati-
cally inapplicable to both the corporation and its stockholder because
"corporate records and documents '30 were involved. Grant, more so
than Wilson, brings into focus a difficulty with making the fifth amend-
ment inapplicable to corporations. Despite the legal status of corpora-
tions as entities, people are nevertheless involved, so the constitutional
rights of the people connected with the corporation are necessarily im-
plicated. After Boyd and Grant a partnership-by definition involving
more than one person-was, inconsistently, considered to have protec-
ted "private papers," whereas an incorporated sole proprietorship had
to forego that protection as a cost of incorporating. As will be seen,
later cases resolved the inconsistency by further restricting the fifth
amendment protection for business records.
B. Unincorporated Associations
The Hale and Wilson decisions were extended from the corporate
sphere to that of the unincorporated association in United States v.
White.3' A labor union had received a subpoena duces tecum to pro-
duce its constitution, bylaws, and certain other union records. White,
the "assistant supervisor" of the union, refused to produce the docu-
ments on the grounds that they might incriminate the union or him-
self, as an officer or individually. White was found in contempt and the
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the right against self-incrimina-
tion applied only to natural individuals and not to organizations such as
corporations. Furthermore, the Court held that representatives of such
a collective group were not entitled to their purely personal rights when
acting as representatives for the group. Boyd, said the Court, had indi-
cated that documents must be the private property of the person claim-
ing the right, or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity,
to be protected. The Court reasoned that the government's historic
28. See text accompanying notes 91-102 infra.
29. 227 U.S. 74 (1913).
30. Id. at 80.
31. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
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regulatory power over corporations was a convenient rationale for
denying them and their officers the right, but that the absence of such
power would not preclude a denial of the fifth amendment right.
Rather,
the power to compel the production of the records of any organization,
whether it be incorporated or not, arises out of the inherent and necessary
power of the federal and state governments to enforce their laws, with the
privilege against self-incrimination being limited to its historic function of
protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination
through his own testimony or personal records.
It follows that labor unions, as well as their officers and agents acting
in their official capacity, cannot invoke this personal privilege.-1
Thus, the scope of the fifth amendment was further narrowed by ex-
cluding from protected "personal records" not only all corporate docu-
ments, but also the documents of most 33 unincorporated groups. It
seemed that merely by associating with others, one forfeited a constitu-
tional right.
After Boyd, the Supreme Court did not reconsider the status of
partnership records with respect to the fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination until 1974, in Bellis v. United States.34  Bellis in-
volved the financial records of a dissolved three-partner law firm. 35 A
subpoena was served on Bellis, then in possession of the records. He
asserted his right against self-incrimination to refuse production, and
was held in contempt. In line with its limited view of the fifth amend-
ment right in White, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that
the small partnership had an independent institutional identity, and
that Bellis therefore held the records in a representative capacity. The
Court observed that Grant had demonstrated that the right did not nec-
essarily exist merely because an organization was small. In addition,
many professions included both corporations and partnerships, and
"the applicability of the privilege should not turn on an insubstantial
difference in the form of the business enterprise."36  Although the
Court indicated the result might be different for a small family partner-
ship or other pre-existing relationship of confidentiality, the fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination had suffered another signi-
ficant limitation.
C. Bankruptcy
A bankrupt retains his right against self-incrimination to the ex-
32. Id. at 700-01.
33. Although the court left open the possibility that the right might still apply to organiza-
tions sufficiently representing private or personal interests rather than group interests, id, at
701-02, this proviso was not applied in later cases. See 3 HOFSTRA L. REv. 467. 477-78 (1975).
34. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
35. The dissolution did not affect the analysis or result. Id. at 96 n.3.
36. Id. at 101. This remark becomes more significant when the Court in later cases sub-
stantially limits the right for sole proprietorships.
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tent that he need not testify orally,37 or personally produce his business
records in court,38 when such actions would serve to incriminate him.
However, the workings of the bankruptcy proceeding limit the protec-
tion afforded by the fifth amendment.
39
In bankruptcy, title to the bankrupt's property passes to a third
party, the trustee. After the change in ownership, the bankrupt's per-
sonal right no longer protects his former records. In Johnson v. United
States the defendant was convicted of concealing money from his
trustee in bankruptcy. Johnson objected that his books, introduced by
the trustee, had been improperly admitted in evidence against him, but
the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. It succinctly held that "[a]
party is privileged from producing [incriminating] evidence but not
from its production [by another]." 41 Furthermore, the Court said that
a person cannot protect his property from being used to pay his debts
by attaching a disclosure of a crime to it, then relying on the fifth
amendment to refuse to relinquish possession. The Court upheld the
compulsion involved because its purpose was the distribution of the
bankrupt's property, rather than the collection of criminal evidence
against him.
In a later bankruptcy case the Court explained that the constitu-
tional right is procedural and does not affect the substantive obligation
to surrender something when another has the property right.42 Com-
mentators have been predictably critical of allowing a technical prop-
erty concept to destroy a constitutional right.43 Even a sole proprietor
may, in effect, lose his right against self-incrimination relating to his
business records if he is adjudged bankrupt. This exception is even
more objectionable than the exceptions for associating with an organi-
zation, because bankruptcy may be wholly involuntary. The trustee's
property right and the bankrupt's constitutional right could both be
upheld by requiring the transfer, and granting the bankrupt immunity
from the use of the information against him."
D. Required Records
The historical required records exception provides that one must
keep and produce records required by law, even though they may be
self-incriminating, and with no grant of immunity from their use in a
criminal prosecution. It is another broad, if rather uncertain, excep-
tion to the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.
37. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 39-40 (1924).
38. See L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FiirH AMENDMENT?. 145 (1959).
39. Id.
40. 228 U.S. 457 (1913).
41. Id. at 458.
42. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 41 (1924).
43. See, e.g., L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FiFrtH A.tEND.MEN-1? 145 (1959).
44. For a fuller discussion of the concept see note 24 supra and the text accompanying
notes 132-33 infra.
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The leading case, Shapiro v. United States,45 extended the doctrine
in 1948 beyond records specifically required by law that had not been
kept previously (such as a pharmacist's records of prescription drugs)
to encompass ordinary business records. 46  Shapiro was served with a
subpoena duces tecum by authority of the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942, under which regulations required a person to "keep and make
available for examination .. . records of the same kind as he has cus-
tomarily kept, relating to the prices which he charges ... ,47
Shapiro produced the records, but asserted that he was protected from
their use against him by his right against self-incrimination. This as-
sertion was rejected, and he was convicted of violating the Act on the
evidence provided by the records. The Supreme Court affirmed, rely-
ing in part on language in the Wilson case that spoke of denying the
fifth amendment protection to "records required by law to be kept in
order that there may be suitable information of transactions which
are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation . . . .,,4 Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court thought it would be incongruous for rec-
ords of an individual to be treated differently from records of a corpor-
ation. The latter rationale ignores the distinction that was decisive in
Wilson,49 as well as the policies and plain language of the fifth amend-
ment.
The Court narrowed the Shapiro holding in a trilogy of cases
decided in 1968.50 It read Shapiro as requiring three prerequisites:
(1) an essentially regulatory (i.e., non-criminal) inquiry; (2) records
of a kind the regulated party had customarily kept; and (3) records
that had assumed "public aspects" making them analogous to public
documents.5 Applying the Shapiro standard, the Court held that
individuals could not be required to register or pay the occupational
52tax of the federal wagering tax statutes, nor to register a regulated
firearm, 53 because of their fifth amendment right against self-incrim-
45. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
46. L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? .46 (1959).
47. Section 14(b) of Maximum Price Regulation 426, 8 Fed. Reg. 9546, 9549 (1943), quoted
at 335 U.S. at 5.
48. 335 U.S. at 17 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S 361, 380 (1911)) (emphasis of
entire quotation, added by Shapiro, omitted). When the federal government can regulate how
much wheat a person can grow for use on his own farm, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942),
what escapes being an "appropriate subject" for its regulation? If any such subjects exist, no
doubt most of them can be reached by state or local governments.
49. The Wilson holding was based on the fact that corporate records were involved, and it
mentioned the required records doctrine only by way of illustration. See Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1, 56-66 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
50. Marchetti, v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S.
62 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
51. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968).
52. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (not records customarily kept; no
.public aspects" to records); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (statute directed at
individuals inherently suspected of criminal activities).
53. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
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ination. It should be noted that these cases are distinguishable from
the typical business records cases involving white collar crime and
statutes that are more regulatory than criminal. Thus, Shapiro is still
viable in many situations involving business records.4
The required records doctrine further limits the constitutional
protection of business records of a sole proprietor. The government
need only choose to regulate a field, and do so in a way that conforms
to the Supreme Court's three standards, for the fifth amendment pro-
tection of business records to evaporate.
E. Instrumentalities, Fruits, and Contraband
A final established exception to the fifth amendment's protection
of business records is related to the fourth amendment and the now
overruled "mere evidence" rule.55 In 1921, Gouled v. United States'
established the rule that merely evidentiary material could not be
seized under a search warrant or incident to arrest, while instru-
mentalities and means by which a crime was committed, fruits of
crime, and contraband could be seized. This dichotomy was based
on the premise, long observed as a fiction, that the government
must have a property interest in material before it could be seized.
Apparently, this property interest also obviated fifth amendment ob-
jections to the material's use against a defendant after the seizure.
Gouled specifically noted that "t]here is no special sanctity in pa-
pers, as distinguished from other forms of property, to render them
immune from search and seizure. . . .58 and inadmissible in evi-
dence. Subsequently, the categories of seizable material were in-
terpreted broadly while the rule remained intact.59 Thus, business
records could be used against a defendant notwithstanding the fifth
amendment if a court was able to call them instrumentalities, fruits,
or contraband.
In 1967, the Supreme Court rejected the mere evidence rule in
Warden v. Hayden.60 It held the clothing that had been seized in that
54. Some lower federal courts have extended the required records doctrine to the tax
field, e.g., Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864
(1953), where its potential sweep is even more tremendous than in the business regulatory
field. See L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FiFrn AMENDMENT. 147 (1959). Lately.
however, the Department of Justice has refrained from invoking the doctrine in the tax field.
See Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459, 462 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969).
55. The "mere evidence" distinction was abandoned by the Supreme Court in Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
56. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
57. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 & n.ll (1967).
58. 255 U.S. at 309.
59. Comment, The Search and Seizure of Private Papers: Fourth and Fifth Amendment
Considerations, 6 LoYoLA L.A.L REv. 274, 280-81 (1973); see reasoning in Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (ledger and utility bills admitted).
60. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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case admissible over fifth amendment objections because it was not
"testimonial" or "communicative. 6 The Court reserved the ques-
tion "whether there are items of evidential value whose very nature
precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and
seizure." 62  If such items could not be seized under the fourth
amendment, then fifth amendment issues concerning them would
never have occasion to arise. The extent to which business records
might be protected under this new standard was unsettled before
Andresen v. Maryland.63
III. RECENT CASES FURTHER LIMITING THE RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION FOR BUSINESS RECORDS
A. Fisher v. United States
The recent case of Fisher v. United State?' provides another
example of the diminution of the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination as it pertains to business records. Three sole pro-
prietors running three separate businesses were each interviewed by
an Internal Revenue agent concerning possible civil or criminal in-
come tax liability. The taxpayers soon obtained documents from
their accountants and transferred the documents to their lawyers who
had been retained in connection with the investigation. The I.R.S.
served a summons on one lawyer to produce the accountant's work-
papers, copies of tax returns, and copies of reports and other cor-
respondence between the accounting firm and the taxpayer. The
other lawyer was similarly ordered to produce the accountant's analy-
sis of the taxpayer's income and expenses which had been copied by
the accountant from the taxpayer's cancelled checks and deposit
receipts. Both lawyers declined to comply, and in each case the
summons was ordered enforced by the district court. One court of
appeals affirmed while the other reversed.65
The Supreme Court initially decided that the taxpayer's fifth
amendment right would not excuse the lawyer from producing the
documents. Nevertheless, the common law attorney-client privilege
would excuse the production if the papers were unobtainable by
summons from the client. The major issue then became "whether
the documents could have been obtained by summons addressed to
the taxpayer while the documents were in his possession."66 The
Court's answer was "yes."
61. See section IV.B.2. infra.
62. 387 U.S. at 303.
63. 427 U.S. 463 (1976). See section III.B. infra.
64. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
65. United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974) (affirming); United States v.
Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974) (reversing).
66. 425 U.S. at 405.
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The Supreme Court interpreted the fifth amendment's protection
as applicable only when a person is (1) compelled to make a (2) testi-
monial communication 7 that is (3) incriminating. If any one of the
three elements is lacking, the right is unavailable. In these cases
substantial compulsion was present, since the Court framed the issue
as if the taxpayers had possession, but the other two prerequisites to
the right were not.68 The Court indicated that the result might be
different if the taxpayer's own tax records, rather than accountants'
workpapers, were involved because the former might be "private
papers" protected under the rule in Boyd. The Court's language
could also be read as implying the result might not be different. 69
Justice Brennan used a different analysis in his concurring opin-
ion. He agreed with the ultimate judgment, but feared that the
majority's opinion portended a crippling of the fifth amendment's
protection of private books and papers. Rather than making a three-
element analysis as the majority had, he concentrated on the privacy
principles which he felt the amendment historically had protected.70
Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment for the reasons stated by
Justice Brennan.71  However, because he felt the outcome of cases
with the majority's approach would be much the same as with the
approach used in earlier cases, he was less pessimistic about the
change than Brennan was.
B. Andresen v. Maryland
Another recent case, Andresen v. Maryland,72 complements Fisher
by dealing with the element of "compulsion!' that was not fully dis-
cussed in Fisher. The issue in Andresen was whether a search war-
rant could be used to reach business records immune from subpoena
because of the fifth amendment.
Andresen was a lawyer working as a sole practitioner. A
government investigation discovered that he had defrauded a client
purchasing land by concealing the existence of two outstanding
liens. When the client learned of the liens, Andresen issued a title
policy guaranteeing clear title. That action defrauded the insurance
company by requiring it to pay the outstanding liens. The investi-
gators concluded there was probable cause to believe Andresen had
67. The Court has never defined this term precisely. In general, the Court uses it to
mean any activity performed for the purpose of communicating. See McCoL.imcK's HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 26465 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
68. For a discussion of each of the three elements see section IV.B.I (compulsion),
section IV.B.2 (testimonial communication), and section IV.B.3 (incrimination) Infra.
69. 425 U.S. at 415 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). See note 99 nfra.
70. See text accompanying notes 151-55 infra for a fuller discussion of Brennan's
opinion in Fisher.
71. 425 U.S. at 434 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
72. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
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committed the state crime of false pretenses and obtained a warrant
to search his law office. Twenty-eight items were seized.
Andresen was charged with multiple counts of false pretenses
and fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary. Five items seized
from the law office were admitted over fifth and fourth amendment
objections. They included documents related to the sale and liens,
and memoranda written in Andresen's handwriting. A jury found
Andresen guilty of eight counts. Four were reversed on appeal on
state law grounds, with the appellate court upholding the trial court
on the constitutional issues.
The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions." It acknowledged
that the seized business records were incriminating, and that some
contained statements made by Andresen-his testimonial communica-
tion. In the majority's view, however, the sole fifth amendment
issue was whether the seizure of the business records and their
admission into evidence "compelled" the defendant to testify against
himself. It concluded that he had not been so compelled.
This time, Justice Brennan vigorously dissented.74 As in Fisher,
he analyzed the case in terms of privacy rather than the three-element
analysis of the majority. Arguing from policy and precedent, he
urged that these records should be protected."
Fisher and Andresen are the most recent cases in a long line of
Supreme Court decisions defining the scope of the fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination. For this reason, the various opinions
in the newer cases are analyzed in the following section, where they
may best be placed in historical perspective. Many cases not involv-
ing business records will be considered in order to clearly establish
the decisional trends.
IV. VIEWS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Introduction
The fifth amendment right against self-incrimination has been
hailed as ".one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make him-
self civilized."1 6  Despite this recognition of its importance, it has
not been consistently interpreted. Justice John Harlan, contrasting
the disparate majority approaches in several cases, once concluded:
73. Id. at 484. On the fourth amendment issue, the Court held that the warrant was not
impermissibly general.
74. Justice Marshall, who wrote the other concurring opinion in Fisher, also dissented.
His dissent, however, was based on fourth amendment grounds, and he did not reach or dis-
cuss the fifth amendment issue. 427 U.S. at 493-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75. For a fuller discussion of Brennan's opinion in Andresen, see text accompanying notes
157-59 infra.
76. E. GRISWOLD, THE 5Tn AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955), quoted in Ullman v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956), and Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
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"I perceive in these cases the essential tension that springs from the
uncertain mandate which this provision of the Constitution gives to
this Court."" Numerous policies have been advanced to help in
interpreting the right;78  Wigmore lists twelve.79  Due to the abun-
dance of policies, courts often select an isolated "straw man" policy,
show how a particular application of the right would not advance this
chosen policy, and then conclude that the right should not apply.5 0
Two main views of the fifth amendment have prevailed over the
years.8 ' Those holding the narrow view, based on an interpretation
of the literal words of the amendment, feel that the amendment was
only meant to protect against compelled testimonial incrimination.
Those supporting the broad view, based on the common law prior to
the amendment's adoption, contend that the amendment is designed
to protect privacy.
8 2
77. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 450 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
78. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
79. (1) It protects the innocent defendant from convicting himself by a bad per-
formance on the witness stand.
(2) It avoids burdening the courts with false testimony.
(3) It encourages third-party witnesses to appear and testify by removing the fear
that they might be compelled to incriminate themselves.
(4) The privilege is a recognition of the practical limits of governmental power,
truthful self-incriminating answers cannot be compelled, so why try.
(5) The privilege prevents procedures of the kinds used by the infamous courts of
Star Chamber, High Commission and Inquisition.
(6) It is justified by history, whose test it has stood; the tradition which it has
created is a satisfactory one.
(7) The privilege preserves respect for the legal process by avoiding situations which
are likely to degenerate into undignified, uncivilized, and regrettable scenes.
(8) It spurs the prosecutor to do a complete and competent independent investiga-
tion.
(9) The privilege aids in the frustration of "bad laws" and "bad procedures," es-
pecially in the area of political and religious belief.
(10) The privilege, together with the requirement of probable cause prior to prose-
cution, protects the individual from being prosecuted for crimes of insufficient notoriety
or seriousness to be of real concern to society.
(11) The privilege prevents torture and other inhumane treatment of a human being.
(12) The privilege contributes toward a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing
him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder
the entire load.
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (citations, footnotes, and explanations
omitted).
80. See, eg., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 56-57 n.5 (1964) (warning
against the practice).
81. The case of Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), upholding a statute requiring a
person to testify if granted immunity, split the Supreme Court along doctrinal lines almost
the same way it is split today. The Brown majority upheld the compulsion of testimony when
it could no longer be incriminating just as the Fisher mjority upheld the compelled production
of documents when the act of producing them was not incriminating. Similarly, a Brown
dissenter felt the amendment was for the "peace and security of the citizen," Id. at 631 (Field,
J., dissenting), a position similar to Justice Brennan's privacy argument advanced in his con-
carting opinion in Fisher and dissenting opinion in Andresen.
82. For a more philosophical approach, see Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and
Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HAv. L Ray.
945 (1977).
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B. The Narrow View
Because the narrow view of the fifth amendment commands a
majority of the United States Supreme Court today in cases con-
cerning business records, it will be profitable to examine it in detail.
This viewpoint requires a (1) compelled (2) testimonial communica-
tion that is (3) incriminating, to invoke the protection of the amend-
ment.
1. Compulsion
The Supreme Court has often interpreted the "compulsion" forbid-
den by the fifth amendment to include indirect compulsion, such as
statutes imposing a penalty on one's assertion of his fifth amend-
ment right. Boyd v. United States83 involved a forfeiture statute
that provided that if a person did not produce his business records,
the prosecutor's allegations relating to the records would be taken as
true. The Court easily found the statute unconstitutional on fifth
(and fourth) amendment grounds.
This trend has continued in recent years.8 4 For instance, Garrity
v. New Jersey8 5 concerned an investigation of police officers for ticket
fixing. Pursuant to a state statute, they were warned that anything
they said could be used against them, that they had the right to remain
silent, but that if they refused to answer they could be dismissed from
their jobs. They answered questions, and their answers were used to
convict them. The Supreme Court reversed because the statements
were "infected [with] coercion"8 6 rather than a "free and rational
choice,"8 7 and because the right against self-incrimination was among
those "rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may
not condition by the exaction of a price."88  Another case extended
the Garrity reasoning to a threat of loss of public contracts for five
years,89 an arguably lesser penalty. 90 The Supreme Court has consis-
tently interpreted "compulsion" as including the compulsion of
a choice between not remaining silent and suffering an economic
loss.
In Couch v. United States,9' however, the Supreme Court upheld
83. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). For a discussion of Boyd, see text accompanying notes 15-22,
supra.
84. See Van AIstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
85. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
86. Id. at 497.
87. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464-65 (966)).
88. 385 U.S. at 500.
89. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
90. Id. at 83.
91. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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another sort of indirect compulsion, that of restrictions on what a
person could do with her business records and still retain her fifth
amendment right concerning them. The taxpayer, a sole proprietor
of a restaurant, had regularly turned her business records over to an
accountant for the preparation of her income tax returns. The In-
ternal Revenue Service began investigating her tax returns and is-
sued a summons to the accountant to produce Couch's business records.
The taxpayer intervened, asserting that her ownership of the records
created a fifth amendment right to bar their production. The Su-
preme Court disagreed and upheld the summons. The Court stated
that only the accountant, not the taxpayer, was compelled to do any-
thing, because compulsion was lacking when there was ownership
without possession. In addition, the Court recognized little expecta-
tion of privacy when much of the information would be disclosed on a
tax return. To recognize the fifth amendment right here, said the
Court, would "interfere with the legitimate interest of society in
enforcement of its laws and collection of the revenues."92
The precise compulsion issue involved in Andresen v. Mary-
land93 -whether a search warrant could be used to reach business
records immune from subpoena because of the fifth amendment-
could not have arisen before 1967 when the Court rejected the mere
evidence rule in Warden v. Hayden.94  Several courts of appeals
subsequently held that the demise of the mere evidence rule allowed
the seizure of evidentiary documents by search warrant whose pro-
duction could not be compelled by subpoena.95
The leading case supporting the opposite view was the Seventh
Circuit case of Hill v. Philpott.96  In Hill the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice had seized thirty-five cartons of financial and patient records from
a doctor's home and office pursuant to a search warrant. The district
92. Id. at 336. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, id. at 338, compared this case
to those cases that had found indirect compulsion sufficient to invoke the right. He contended
that the complexity of the tax laws required professional assistance, so that the majority at-
tached a penalty to the right against self-incrimination by forcing a taxpayer to forego such
assistance. Justice Douglas interpreted the majority's suggestion that the result might be dif-
ferent if the accountant had been Couch's employee, 409 U.S. at 334 n.18, as in effect sa ing,
"because her business did not call for, or because she could not afford, a full-time accountant,
[she] deserves less protection under the Fifth Amendment than a taxpayer more fortunately
situated:' Id. at 342 n.4 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Thus, a direct penalty for exercising one's
fifth amendment right violates the right but a significant de facto penalty does not.
93. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
94. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). For a discussion of Hayden, see text accompanying notes 60-
62 supra.
95. See cases cited in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470 n.5 (1976). For instance,
in United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 852 (1969) and 402 U.S. 984
(1971), the Second Circuit found that there was no distinction for constitutional purposes be-
tween the seizure of a letter that was evidence of a conspiracy in that case, and the seizure of
the clothing in Hayden. Similarly, in United States v. Blank, 459 F.2d 383, cert. denied, 409
U.S. 887 (1972), the Sixth Circuit denied there was compulsion in the use of a search w'arrant
to obtain the records of an illegal gambling business.
96. 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
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court upheld that action, but the court of appeals reversed. It felt
the distinction between obtaining papers by search warrant and ob-
taining them by subpoena was more shadow than substance. A
search warrant still compelled a defendant to testify because the jury
knew the books and records were his, even though another person
might authenticate them. In the realities of trial, "the entries he
has made . . . speak against him as clearly as his own voice."97 The
court of appeals acknowledged that the fifth amendment made crimi-
nal prosecutions more difficult, but noted that this was its clear intent.
In Andresen, however, the Supreme Court adopted the view that
a search warrant does not involve compulsion. The Court relied on
Fisher and Couch v. United States9 8 in its analysis. It interpreted
Fisher as holding that a lawyer's production of his "client's tax rec-
ords"99 did not violate the taxpayer's fifth amendment right because
the taxpayer was not compelled to do anything. Couch involved a
similar holding1°° for records in the hands of an accountant. The
Andresen case likewise lacked compulsion, according to the Court,
because the defendant was not asked to say or do anything-he made
the records voluntarily, law enforcement personnel conducted the
search and seizure, and a handwriting expert authenticated the
records at trial. Thus, even when a subpoena would violate the fifth
amendment by compelling a person to testimonially indicate the
existence, possession, or authenticity of documents, a valid seizure by
law enforcement officials may reach the same documents.
In addition, the Court argued in Andresen that the seizure of busi-
ness records during a lawful search would not undermine any of the
policies of the amendment. The Court noted that the defendant was
not subjected to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or con-
tempt, that there was no greater danger of inhumane treatment than
with any other search, and that the statements were trustworthy because
they were already in existence. This analysis can be criticized on two
grounds. First, the "trustworthy" rationale, while accurate for Andre-
sen because he did not know the outcome of his case in advance, will
become inaccurate for potential defendants relying on that case in the
future. Someone in Andresen's position now knows it ultimately may
be advantageous to plant inaccurate material in his files. This action
could lead to the use of fabricated evidence at trials. Second, the anal-
97. Id. at 149.
98. 409 U.S. 322 (1973). For a discussion of Couch, see notes 91 and 92 supra, and ac-
companying text.
99. 427 U.S. at 472. Note that Fisher basically involved accountant's workpapers, 425 U.S.
at 394, and the Court distinguished the documents in that case from the taxpayer's "own tax
records," id. at 414, suggesting the outcome might be differenm with the latter. Andresen
blurred this distinction, as Justice Brennan had predicted in his opinion in Fisher. Id. at 415
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
100. 409 U.S. at 323.
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ysis is an example of the Court using "straw man" policies to emascu-
late the amendment. The Court in Andresen quoted without discussion
a list of additional policies it had set forth earlier as being reflected in
the amendment's protection. These included: "a fair state-individual
balance . . .; our respect . . . of the right of each individual to a pri-
vate enclave where he may lead a private life . . .; and our realization
that the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a pro-
tection to the innocent." 0 1 In particular, the Court's decision in An-
dresen denies to the sole proprietor even the small "private enclave" of
his own handwritten notes in his own files.102 This holding amounts to
putting a de facto penalty on writing down one's thoughts on paper
where they can be seized, rather than keeping a mental note that is
protected by the fifth amendment.
The Supreme Court has consistently struck down statutes com-
pelling someone to forfeit his fifth amendment right or else suffer an
economic loss. It has, however, upheld compulsion generated by the
circumstances of business necessity, such as the complexity of the tax
laws requiring professional assistance in Couch, and the need to keep
business records on paper rather than mentally in Andresen. Nothing
in the language or policies of the amendment supports this distinction.
Both situations are indirect forms of compulsion in that a person is
never directly compelled to waive his fifth amendment right, but in-
stead must choose between his right and the economic loss or de-
mands of business necessity.
If anything, the policies behind the amendment are stronger when
the compulsion results from circumstances rather than from a stat-
ute. In situations involving statutory penalties, one is not in danger of
inadvertently forfeiting his fifth amendment right, since the need to
choose between the right and the penalty would be clearly presented.
Once confronted with the choice, a person is in a position to rationally
weigh the alternatives. Conversely, in cases of compulsion by circum-
stances, one may lose one's fifth amendment right unknowingly. It is
highly unlikely that Andresen considered the potential loss of his consti-
tutional right when he decided to commit his thoughts to paper. Had
he considered that factor, he would have been forced to make a deci-
sion based on incomplete data, since he had no way of knowing when
the government might choose to seize his records. This constant uncer-
tainty more seriously impinges upon a "zone of physical freedom" than
101. 427 U.S. at 476 n.8 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
102. Justice Brennan, in his Andresen dissent, contended that a search and seizure in-
volves compulsion just as a subpoena does, because a person is not free to resist government
authority. Even when the person is not present, his door indicates symbolic resistance. A
person is compelled, according to Justice Brennan, if the government denies him "a zone of
physical freedom necessary for conducting [his] affairs." 427 U.S. at 487 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). Justice Brennan's definition of compulsion is satisfied whenever a search and
seizure intrudes on this zone of privacy.
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does a confrontation presenting a clear choice. The Court's disregard
of compulsion by circumstances as a genuine form of compulsion pro-
scribed by the fifth amendment is unjustified.
2. Testimonial Communication
The exclusion from the fifth amendment's protection of nontesti-
monial evidence began in 1910, and has since continually expanded. In
Holt v. United States, °'3 a defendant was found guilty of murder after
he had been compelled to put on a blouse to determine whether it fit
him. The Supreme Court felt that barring this evidence would be "an
extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment,"'04 and contrasted the
use of a defendant's body as evidence with the extortion of communi-
cations from him by physical or psychological compulsion.
Schmerber v. Californiatos relied on this reasoning in upholding
the withdrawal of a blood sample and the use of a chemical analysis of
its alcohol content in evidence. The Court followed Holt but added
several cautionary limitations. First, the Court reiterated that the right
protects communication in any form, including compliance with a sub-
poena to produce one's papers. Second, it warned that the distinction
between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence may break down in
some cases, as with a lie detector test measuring bodily changes but ob-
taining responses that are essentially testimonial.
A pair of 1967 Supreme Court cases, United States v. Wade'0 6 and
Gilbert v. California,10 7 extended the "nontestimonial" exclusion by
upholding requirements that a defendant speak in a lineup and give a
handwriting exemplar. Both the voice and the handwriting were con-
sidered mere identifying physical characteristics. As Justice Marshall
later pointed out, 108 these two cases were not direct extensions of
Schmerber and Holt, which had only required the defendants to pas-
sively submit. Wade and Gilbert required their active cooperation, a
much more serious interference with an individual's personality.
In California v. Byers,109 a four-man plurality of the Supreme
Court further limited the definition of "testimonial" in upholding a Cal-
ifornia statute requiring the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an
accident to stop at the scene and to give his name and address. Stop-
ping, the plurality said, was not testimonial any more than giving hand-
writing or blood samples. Furthermore, disclosure of one's name and
103. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
104. Id. at 252.
105. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
106. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
107. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
108. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 36-37 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
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address "is an essentially neutral act."110 The statute merely required
evidence of identity, which the Court suggested was "real or physical
evidence," even though it was information-in contrast to the voice itself
in Wade-from the mouth of the accused.
Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment on other grounds. In
disagreement with the plurality, he argued that self-identification was
testimonial."1 The two dissenting opinions, joined in by a total of four
Justices, both vigorously rejected the plurality's view that the disclo-
sures were nontestimonial. Justice Black asked, "[w]hat evidence can
possibly be more 'testimonial' than a mans own statement that he is a
person who has just been involved in an automobile accident inflicting
property damage?"112  Justice Brennan expressed the same thought
by comparing the statute to one requiring all robbers to stop and
leave their names and addresses with their victims.
1 1 3
The Court continued to define "testimonial" narrowly when it
held in Fisher v. United States1 4 that the production, in response to a
subpoena, of documents written by another was nontestimonial.1 5
The Court initially considered two ways in which the production of the
documents might be testimonial communication: first, through the con-
tents of the documents, and second, from the actual act of produc-
tion. The Court reasoned that because the accountant's workpapers
were not the taxpayer's, they contained no testimonial declarations
by the taxpayer, but instead were analogous to the blood, hand-
writing, and voice samples previously held admissable.
The Court acknowledged that the act of producing the documents
had communicative aspects by conceding the existence of the papers,
their possession or control by the taxpayer, and the taxpayer's belief
that the papers were those described by the subpoena. Nevertheless,
the Court felt the act was not sufficiently testimonial under the cir-
110. Id. at 432. The "neutral act" rationale may explain why disclosure is not in-
criminating, but how does it justify caling the act nontestimonial? Later in the opinion.
the plurality clearly discussed the fact that giving one's name was not incriminating (id. at
433-34) in the section where it said it would be explaining why it wras not testimonial (id. at
431).
111. Id. at 435-36 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
112. Id. at 462-63 (Black, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 473 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
115. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Fisher questioned the majority's treatment
of the act of production as nontestimonial. He asserted that the majority incorrectly had
made the protection against self-incrimination turn on the strength of the government's case,
denying the right because the government had alternative sources for the information.
Justice Marshall felt the majority's new approach of focusing on the elements of produc-
tion rather than on the contents of documents would usually lead to the same result. He noted
that there would be "a precise inverse relationship between the private nature of the docu-
ment and the permissibility of assuming its existence." Id. at 433 (Marshall, J., concurring).
One could assume corporate records existed, but could not make the same assumption for
most private papers. When a document's existence could not be assumed, then its produc-
tion would communicate its existence and be testimonial.
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cumstances to receive the protection of the fifth amendment. It stated:
"The existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion
and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Gov-
ernment's information by conceding that he in fact has the papers.""
16
Although the distinctions are subtle and difficult to draw precisely,
the Supreme Court in Fisher probably ignored its own warning in
Schmerber that some methods of obtaining "physical evidence," such
as lie detector tests, actually obtain testimonial responses. The act of
production possesses the three testimonial aspects listed earlier-the
existence, possession, and implied authentication of the papers-even
though the documents are "physical evidence," as well.
From a policy standpoint, this narrow view that only "testimonial
communications" receive the protection of the fifth amendment pre-
sents several dangers.11 7 There is the risk of mental and physical coer-
cion, including the techniques used to extract involuntary confessions.
In addition, forcing a defendant to condemn himself violates the respect
for a person's dignity underlying the fifth amendment right. These
dangers, rather minimal in the earlier cases of Holt (wearing blouse)
and Schmerber (blood sample), where only the defendant's passive sub-
mission was required, become increasingly significant as greater active
cooperation is expected from the defendant. Thus, the "testimonial"
limitation on the fifth amendment's protection that allows the govern-
ment to compel the production of incriminating business records if writ-
ten by another is highly regrettable from a policy standpoint.
3. Incrimination
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the fifth amend-
ment's protection covers only evidence that tends to incriminate.
Some Justices have urged that it should also protect human dig-
nity and shield an individual from infamy and disgrace even when there
is no possibility of incrimination," 8 but this has always been a minority
viewpoint. The issue remains, however, as to how great the danger of
self-incrimination must be before one may invoke the fifth amend-
ment.
In Brown v. Walker,"9 the Supreme Court upheld an immunity stat-
ute against fifth amendment attack, asserting that the "imaginary and
unsubstantial character" of the danger of prosecution by another juris-
diction was insufficient to end a person's duty to testify.'20 Rather, the
116. Id. at 411.
117. MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 265-66 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
118. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 445, 449 ((956) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 631 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting),
119. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
120. Id. at 608. The two jurisdiction rule was overruled in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
[Vol. 38:351
BUSINESS RECORDS
danger must be "real and appreciable" for the fifth amendment
right to be applicable.12 1  Some commentators have asserted that the
"real and appreciable" test is now only a verbal formula no longer
strictly applied. 2 Others go further, and maintain that the right is now
recognized whenever there is the merest possibility of incrimination.'2
Supporting the latter view, the Supreme Court in Hoffman v. United
States124 reversed a criminal contempt conviction for refusal on fifth
amendment grounds to answer questions before a federal grand jury.
The Court held that the rights applied unless it is "'perfectly clear,
from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that
the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have
such tendency' to incriminate.
' 1
"
As with other issues, however, several recent decisions have nar-
rowed the scope of this aspect of the fifth amendment's protection. In
California v. Byers,12 6 all three California courts that considered the
case felt there was a substantial hazard of self-incrimination in the dis-
closures required by the statute, and that the defendant was actually
charged with a criminal violation of the Vehicle Code. 127 However,
a United States Supreme Court plurality concluded that "disclosures
with respect to automobile accidents simply do not entail the kind of
substantial risk of self-incrimination" required to invoke the fifth
amendment's protection.128 This decision both articulated the standard
as "substantial risk," and indicated that the standard would be quite
difficult to attain. Because the statute was basically regulatory rather
than criminal, the Court was especially reluctant to uphold the fifth
amendment claim. However, a person forced to incriminate himself
will find little solace in the fact it occurred under a "regulatory" rather
than a "criminal" statute. One does not really need the protection of
a constitutional right if the government is not interested in doing what
the right proscribes. It is precisely when the government wants to reg-
ulate a field that the protection of a constitutional right becomes
crucial.
Fisher v. United States12 9 continued this restrictive trend. The
fact that the contents of the papers might be incriminating was irrel-
evant in the Court's view since the contents were not testimonial com-
munications of the taxpayer. Assuming arguendo that the act of pro-
121. 161 U.S. at 599.
122. Eg., McCom'tcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EviDEN'%CE 263 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972).
123. Eg., B. SCHWARTZ, CONsTFIuTIONAL LAW 229 (1972).
124. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
125. Id. at 488 (emphasis, and alteration of "answer[s]," in original; citations omitted).
126. 402 U.S. 424 (1971); also discussed in text accompanying notes 109-13 supra.
127. Id. at 464 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. 402 U.S. at 431.
129. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). For a discussion of Fisher, see section III.A. supra.
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ducing the papers did have testimonial significance, the Court noted
that it is not illegal to seek accounting help or for the accountant to
prepare work papers and deliver them to the taxpayer. Thus, neither
the existence of the papers nor their possession by the taxpayer posed
a realistic threat of incrimination. Furthermore, the Court asserted
that since the taxpayer would not be competent to authenticate the ac-
countant's workpapers, and the documents could not be used in evi-
dence without authenticating testimony, there was no "substantial
threat"" of self-incrimination in the taxpayer expressing his belief,
through production, that the papers were those described in the sub-
poena.13
1
Fisher's "substantial threat" test is similar to Byers' "substantial
risk" formulation. By focusing only on the act of producing the papers
and ignoring their contents, the Court precludes the defendants from
reaching the standard.
In both Fisher and Byers, the Court divided the arguably incrim-
inating situations into component parts, then considered each compo-
nent separately in determining whether "incrimination" might occur.
Furthermore, the same component had to be both "testimonial" and
"incriminating" for the majority to hold the fifth amendment right
applicable. In Fisher, four components were present: (1) the contents
of the documents; (2) their existence; (3) their possession by the tax-
payer; and (4) their implied authentication. None of these components
met both the "testimonial" and "incriminating" tests. One might
almost infer that a clear confession would not be incriminating because
each word, by itself, is innocuous. This approach is unrealistic. A
prosecutor would use all incriminating components in his case, and the
defendant would be convicted by their combined effect. The Court
should look at a situation in its totality in determining whether or not it
is incriminating.
At times the fifth amendment may be in conflict with other inter-
ests of society, including the need to prosecute criminals and the need
to protect the civil interests of victims. These conflicts, however, may
frequently be reconciled through the use of immunity statutes, which
permit the state to compel the testimony of one participant in a criminal
activity in order to convict the others. Similarly, when the state inter-
est is civil recovery by the victim, as in Byers, a grant of immunity from
criminal prosecution protects both the victim's pecuniary interest and
the defendant's fifth amendment right. 32  In either case, the one
130. Id. at 413.
131. Justice Brennan argued that the taxpayer's implicit iuthentication of the papers
through their production did pose a substantial threat of self-incrimination. Again, he felt
.the majority was improperly denying the right merely because the government had alternative
methods of authentication.
132. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 463-64 (1971) (Black, .J., dissenting).
[Vol. 38:351
BUSINESS RECORDS
granted immunity may be prosecuted by completely independent evi-
dence, with the burden of proof as to its independence on the prosecu-
tion.13 3  The narrow view of the fifth amendment is not, therefore, ne-
cessary to protect the interests of society.
C. The Broad View
Proponents of the broad view of the fifth amendment rely on the
common law to explain its meaning, rather than on an interpretation
of the amendment's literal words. They emphasize the policy of protec-
ting the individual from government interference more than do those
holding the narrow view. This expansive interpretation has generally
commanded only a minority of the Supreme Court.
The conflict between the broad and narrow views first surfaced
on the issue of immunity statutes. In Brown v. Walker,'3 the majority
upheld a statute requiring a witness to give incriminating testimony
upon a grant of immunity. Four justices dissented, stating the fifth
amendment gave absolute protection that could not be changed by
acts of Congress. 135  Justice Field argued that all constitutional pro-
visions securing rights or privileges to the citizen should be construed
liberally for the widest effect.1 36  In particular, he argued, the fifth
amendment springs from regard for "personal self-respect, liberty,
independence, and dignity,', 137 and includes protection from testimony
leading to infamy and disgrace even if it is not incriminating.1 38  When
the same issue arose more recently, 139 Justice Douglas contended
that the amendment protected individual conscience and human dig-
nity from government compulsion 14 0-as well as safety and security.
One case where the majority of the Supreme Court recognized the
values supporting the broad view of the fifth amendment, at least in
dicta, was Murphy v. Waterfront Commission. 41  The Court listed
many of the "fundamental values and most noble aspirations" reflected
in the right, including "our respect for the inviolability of the human
personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life.' ,,142 Seldom has the majority so clearly
recognized the protection of privacy as part of the fifth amendment.
The case's holding, however, that the fifth amendment protects a state
133. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
134. 161 U.S. 591 (1896). See note 81 supra.
135. Id. at 610 (Shiras, J., dissenting) and 630 (Field, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 631 (Field, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 632 (quoting counsel; emphasis omitted).
138. Id.'at 631 (Field, J., dissenting).
139. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
140. Id. at 445, 449 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
141. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
142. 378 U.S. at 55.
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witness against self-incrimination under federal law, and vice versa,
could easily have been reached under the narrow view of the amend-
ment. It was merely a recognition that the circumstances presented a
"real and appreciable" 1 43 threat of self-incrimination.
In the cases where the majority developed its "testimonial" limit
to the fifth amendment, the usual dichotomy on the court reappeared.
In Schmerber v. California,144 the majority upheld the taking of a blood
sample from the defendant over his objection. Justice Black com-
plained in his dissent of the imprecision of the word "testimonial,"
adopted from Wigmore, who favored keeping the fifth amendment
right "within limits the strictest possible. 145  Justice Douglas also
reminded the Court of the fifth amendment zone of privacy it had
recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut.1
46
In United States v. Wade,147 the Court upheld as nontestimonial
a requirement that a defendant speak in a lineup. The dissenters again
protested that there were additional values historically protected by the
amendment, which the majority should have considered. Justice For-
tas pointed out the importance of the amendment to the balance be-
tween the rights of the individual and those of the state. 48 The roots of
the amendment, he felt, went deeper than opposition to the use of tor-
ture to coerce confessions. He argued that the fifth amendment went
directly "to the nature of a free man and to his relationship to the
state."1 49  In a similar case involving handwriting exemplars, Justice
Marshall noted in dissent that the testimonial limitation ignored the
amendment's purpose of preserving "the inviolability of the human
personality" since it allows officials to enlist an individual's will in
incriminating himself.'
50
The recent business records cases have continued to reflect this
split in the Court. Although Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment
in Fisher v. United States,15' he expressed concern at the majority's
derogation of the fifth amendment's role as a protector of privacy. He
explained at length that an individual's books and papers are extensions
of his person, and that people should have the freedom to think private
thoughts as facilitated by pen and paper.1 2  He would protect books
143. See text accompanying notes 119-21 supra.
144. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
145. Id. at 774 (Black, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 778 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965).
147. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
148. Id. at 262 (Fortas, J., dissenting in part).
149. Id. at 261 (FQrtas, J., dissenting in part).
150. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 33, 35 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (cita-
tion omitted).
151. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
152. ,Jd. at 420 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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and papers in a "zone of privacy," which he extensively defined, from
compulsory production.153  Justice Brennan noted the difficulty of de-
termining whether or not business records were private papers. Ac-
quiescing in the holdings of prior cases, he concluded that generally
the records of business entities were not private, while those of the
unincorporated sole proprietor were.15 4 He apparently did not consider
the Fisher records private, however, because they had originated with
the independent accountant rather than with the sole proprietor. Al-
though one criterion of Brennan's "zone" was whether or not the infor-
mation had been disclosed to a third party,'55 Justice Douglas had ear-
lier contended that giving records to one person (an accountant) for
one purpose (completing tax returns) did not commit them to the public
domain.'56
In Andresen v. Maryland 57 Brennan lamented that the majority
had confined the dominion of privacy to the mind and was denying the
individual "a zone of physical freedom necessary for conducting one s
affairs."' 58  Relying on prior cases holding the fifth amendment
right to apply to the business records of a sole proprietor, he found
the records involved in Andresen to be within the zone of privacy pro-
tected by the amendment. He felt the majority ignored the "essential
spirit" of the amendment by not protecting the "private zone compris-
ing the mere physical extensions of an individuars thoughts and knowl-
edge,' ' 159 including business records.
The broad view of the fifth amendment, as presently interpreted,
does not include all business records within the amendment's protec-
tion. It focuses on whether or not a person had a "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy" 60 concerning the documents involved. By this criter-
ion, the records of business entities would generally not be protected,
while those of a sole proprietor would generally receive the amend-
ment's protection. Thus, this view shields more business records than
does the narrow view.
The historical background leading up to the adoption of the fifth
amendment supports the broad view of the amendment rather tl~an
the narrow view. According to Leonard Levy, author of the defin-
itive history of the amendment, "its framers meant to bequeath a large
153. Id. at 424-28.
154. Id. at 426-27.
155. Id. at 425.
156. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 340 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See
also Moskovitz v. Hynes, 48 App. Div. 2d 804, 369 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1975) (petitioner, who had
turned records over to United States Senate subcommittee, could still claim his fifth amend-
ment rights concerning them when they were subpoenaed by the Attorney General).
157. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
158. Id. at 487 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 486 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,-424 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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and still-growing principle." 16' Some of the positions taken by the
Supreme Court Justices holding the broad view, such as their opposi-
tion to immunity statutes, 162 are questionable in that they are unsup-
ported by the preconstitutional history163 and are contrary to strong
countervailing policy considerations. In general, however, the broad
view better reflects the spirit and policy behind the fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination.1
64
V. CONCLUSION
As many of the foregoing cases illustrate, in the field of business
records the Supreme Court apparently regards the constitutional right
against self-incrimination as a mere common law privilege, to be bal-
anced and frequently superseded by countervailing factors. This treat-
ment of the right ignores the historic reason for and function of the Bill
of Rights as limiting the otherwise unrestricted power of govern-
ment.1 6' The Court's use of the term "privilege"' 66 instead of the term
"right" is a telling indication of its attitude.
1 67
Levy, writing about the Court's "ever-widening, liberal interpreta-
tion" of the fifth amendment generally [unlike its more restrictive view
when business records are involved] observed that "[iun effect the Court
has taken the position that the Fifth embodied the still evolving com-
mon law of the matter, rather than a precise rule of fixed meaning.
168
This evolution may be defensible when it is used to expand a con-
stitutional right over time, but not when it is used to narrow a right.
The Bill of Rights was not intended to aid prosecutorial efficiency, speed,
convenience, or the revelation of truth. Instead, it embodied a judg-
ment that the determination of guilt or innocence should be made with-
out the accused making an unwilling contribution to his own convic-
tion.1 69  The Constitution is of course subject to interpretation, but
courts should regard it as a more permanent characterization of govern-
mental powers and limitations than are common law principles which
more appropriately change over time.
Before the 1975 Supreme Court Term, the fifth amendment right
161. L. LEVY, The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History and Judicial tlistory, in
JUDGMENTS 265, 275 (1972).
162. See text accompanying notes 134-40 supra.
163. L. LEVY, The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History and Judicial tfistory, in
JUDGMENTS 265, 276 (1972).
164. Id. at 274.
165. See L. LEvY, AGAINST THE LAW 171 (1974).
166. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 475 (1976): Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 402 (1976).
167. See note I supra.
168. L. LEVY, The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History and Judicial listory, in
JUDGMENTS 265, 274 (1972).
169. L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW 145 (1974).
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against self-incrimination was inapplicable to the following records:
those of corporations and unincorporated associations; those of bank-
rupts; required records; and instrumentalities, fruits, and contraband
of crime. Since then, the Supreme Court has also excepted account-
ants' workpapers currently held by the taxpayer who was compelled to
produce them in Fisher, and handwritten notes by and in the possession
of a sole proprietor when they were obtained by search warrant rather
than by subpoena in Andresen. Apparently, the only business records
still protected by the fifth amendment are those of a sole proprietor
that do not fall within any of the exceptions for bankrupt's records, re-
quired records, or instrumentalities, fruits, and contraband of crime.
Additionally, the records must not have been written by another, and
must be so secret that a search warrant cannot describe them with
constitutional specificity. The Supreme Court has treated this fifth
amendment constitutional right like a mere common law privilege to
the point of virtually abolishing it. The businessman who can keep all
his records mentally still has a secure fifth amendment right. Others
must struggle to fit into an ever-narrowing protected zone.
Georganne R. Higgins
1977)

